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2010 DILLON LECTURE: REBOOTING INDIAN LAW IN THE
SUPREME COURT
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHERt
Aanii.
It is an honor to deliver the 2010 lecture in honor of South Dakota Supreme
Court Associate Justice Charles Hall Dillon. Justice Dillon, I was pleased to
discover, delivered an important dissent in an American Indian law case in 1924,
Dakota Life Insurance Co. v. Morgan. The majority had reversed a trial court
decision affirming a life insurance award favoring the estate of an Indian who
had represented to the insurance company that he was one-quarter Indian blood.
Back then, it appears, insurance companies would refuse to insure the lives of
Indian people unless they were one-quarter Indian blood or less. 2 It turned out
the Indian, Jesse Kezena, was a full-blood Indian, and the insurance company
wanted its money back. In dissent, objecting to the majority's agreement with
the insurer, Justice Dillon wrote:
The highest function of the court should be to administer justice and not to
engage in hairsplitting contests for the purposes of ascertaining the degree
of Indian blood that may be possessed by the insured, especial V when
investigation, adjustment, and payment of the loss had been made.
Given the time - 1924 - this may have been a courageous dissent. And so I
am honored to help us remember this jurist this year.
In 1990, twenty years before Citizens United v. FEC,4 the United States
Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,5 one of the more
controversial pronouncements issued by the Court in recent decades (and it
appears one of the key cases that the students in this year's moot court
t Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Director, Indigenous Law and Policy
Center. J.D., University of Michigan. Enrolled citizen, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians. Chief Appellate Justice, Poarch Band of Creek Indians; Appellate Justice, Hoopa Valley Tribe
and Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians. Chi-miigwetch to the South Dakota Law Review and the
University of South Dakota School of Law Native American Law Students Association. This is an
expanded and edited version of the 2010 Dillon Lecture. Thanks to Kirsten Carlson, Kristen Carpenter,
Kate Fort, David Geyer, Alex Hagen, J.R. LaPlante, Lonnie Wright, John Petoskey, Frank
Pommersheim, Wenona Singel, Paul Spruhan, and Dean Barry Vickery.
1. 199 N.W. 43, 45-46 (S.D. 1924) (Dillon, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 44 ("In its complaint plaintiff alleged that it was contrary to its rules to insure or
accept as risks Indians of the full blood or the half blood ....
3. Id. at 46 (Dillon, J., dissenting). He added:
The court should not, as a matter of law, permit life insurance companies to engage in the
business of insuring the lives of our Indian people, and, after receiving the premium, wait until
the death of the insured and then, after proof of loss, adjust the loss and pay the policy in full
and, after doing so, bring an action for a return of the money so paid.
Id. at 45 (Dillon, J., dissenting).
4. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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competition will reference in their quest for glory). Smith completely changed
the federal law of government interference with religious practices, holding that
the Court would no longer apply strict scrutiny to government decisions that
burdened religion. 6  The decision sparked a massive lobbying effort and
succeeded in persuading Congress to overrule the decision legislatively.7 In
hindsight, Smith was a perfect vehicle for a Supreme Court majority led by
Justice Scalia to undermine Warren Court-era precedents on religious freedom.
The case involved two Native American Church practitioners who ingested
peyote in ceremonies. But the problem is that both men were drug rehabilitation
counselors who had been fired and were seeking unemployment compensation.
From the point of view of most people, the case involved two drug rehabilitation
counselors who were inexplicably drug abusers themselves - in other words, a
perfect vehicle for a significant change in the law undermining protections for
such allegedly criminal outliers.
As practitioners and scholars, we rarely look at federal Indian law in the big
picture, with a strategy geared toward moving the law in a specific direction.
Unlike the civil rights movement of the 1940s and 1950s spearheaded by
Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg, and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,8
culminating in Brown v. Board of Education,9 and unlike the women's rights
movement spearheaded by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU in the late 1960s
and 1970s, there has never been anything that could be characterized as a
"movement" in federal Indian law. Instead, Indian nations and advocates - and
the federal judiciary - view Indian law through a reactionary lens, deciding
major issues as the cases arise. There are a few mini-movements, during which
long-term strategies were employed on a particular issue, such as the Cobell1I, 12
litigation, the fishing rights cases of the 1960s and 1970's, and perhaps a few
others. Even those series of cases could hardly be called a strategic
"movement." As a result of a lack of a viable long-term strategy, I posit that
tribal interests are and will continue to be punching bags in Supreme Court
litigation.
My talk will proceed in three parts. First, I will discuss several cases from
the past few decades, cases that tribal advocates find to be terrible and
6. Id. at 890.
7. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (2006).
8. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); JACK GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE: METHODS, LIMITS, AND ROLE IN DEMOCRACY 16-23 (1974).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See generally Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU
Women 's Rights Project, It TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157 (2002). For commentary about then-Professor
Ginsburg's run-in with Indian law in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), see ALVIN J.
ZIONTZ, A LAWYER IN INDIAN COUNTRY: A MEMOIR 177-78 (2009), and Carole Goldberg, Finding the
Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1003, 1005-07 (2009).
11. E.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
12. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v.
Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979).
2010l
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inexplicable losses given the foundational principles of federal Indian law
articulated in the Marshall Trilogy and in the first Cohen Handbook. I will
demonstrate that many of these cases were easy cases for the Court to decide
against tribal interests, or what Justice Scalia would call a "laugher,"' 13 as he did
in depicting Carcieri v. Salazar.14 Second, I will discuss the current strategies
that tribal interests employ in litigating important cases in the federal judiciary
and in the Supreme Court. I label this strategy - if it could be called that -
reactionary, in that nearly all significant Indian law cases involve tribal reactions
or defenses to situations initiated by others. To be fair, my research shows that
the Supreme Court frequently accepts petitions for writ of certiorari from
adversaries to tribal interests, putting tribal interests on the defensive anyway.
15
Finally, I will offer suggestions on how to reboot federal Indian law in the
federal judiciary and the Supreme Court. I will discuss cases or lines of cases
that demonstrate how Indian nations can persevere in the Supreme Court and
suggest potential long-term strategies for tribal interests to pursue.
I. THE LOSSES
Tribal interests, which I define in my scholarship as Indian nations and
individual Indians involved in litigation that tend to represent the interest of
Indian nations, fare horribly in the federal courts and most especially in the
Supreme Court. Dean David Getches and Professor Alex Skibine have most
famously demonstrated how tribal interests have been on the down side of more
than 75 percent of the Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court since
about 1987.16 Compare that outcome to the period of time between 1959 - the
beginning of what Professor Charles Wilkinson called the "modem era" of
federal Indian law - until 1987 or so, where tribal interests prevailed in just
under 60 percent of the cases. 17 It was 1987 when the newly-elevated Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the newly-appointed Justice Scalia decided their first
Indian law cases in their respective positions.
And so we go to the cases. I apologize in advance for the characterization
of these cases. They are not the way anyone who understands the context of
these cases would describe them, but my proffered characterizations may help
demonstrate how federal judges and Justices view these cases. If there is any
doubt about the way that the Supreme Court and their clerks caricature tribal
interests, I urge you to read a few cert pool memos.
We have already considered Employment Division v. Smith, the case about
13. Nazune Menka, The Case is a Laugher, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May 29, 2009, available at
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/46461082.html.
14. 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
15. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as a Barrier to
Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 933, 935 (2009).
16. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law. The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 280-81 (2001); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. REv. 777, 781 (2006).
17. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 935.
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the Indian (only one of the two petitioners was an Indian) drug rehab counselor
who took drugs. It doesn't help that the case came about during the War on
Drugs announced by the Reagan Administration only a few years earlier. What
about Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie?18 There, the state of Alaska began
constructing a public school on Native property, largely for the benefit of the
indigenous people of the area. The village sought to impose a tax on the
construction, essentially a tax on the state. Once the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
tribal tax, there must have been no doubt the Court would reverse using
whatever legal justification it could find. And so, according to the Supreme
Court, there is no Indian Country (except for one reservation) in Alaska. 19 How
about Duro v. Reina, where an Indian tribe sought to impose criminal penalties
on a person who was not a citizen of the tribe, could not vote in tribal elections,
could not serve on a jury, could never (on account of his ethnicity) become a
citizen or vote with the tribe, and wasn't even entitled to paid counsel in case of
indigent status? Dare I say more? Was the outcome there surprising?
To extend the citizenship notion further along this continuum, there are the
civil jurisdiction cases; namely Montana v. United States2 1 and Brendale v.
Colville Confederated Tribes.22  In both cases, non-Indians (remember, they
cannot ever be citizens and have few, if any, political rights in tribal
government) living within reservation borders but on fee simple land no longer
subject to federal supervision successfully opposed tribal government regulation
of their hunting and fishing rights and use of their own land.
And then there's Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.2' The Ninth
Circuit there held that the State of Alaska was immune from suit by citizens of
other states and even citizens of Alaska, but somehow not suits brought by
Indian tribes. And don't forget that the underlying suit involved a state natural
resources revenue sharing plan benefiting only Native Alaskan villages and
excluding all other villages, a plan asserted to be racially discriminatory by the
State's attorney general. Occasionally, tribal interests are chewed up in the buzz-
saw of states' rights and federalism, as in Seminole Tribe v. Florida24 and Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe.25 For key federalism thinkers like Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas, and numerous lower court judges, nothing in the Constitution protects
tribal sovereignty (if it exists at all). In fact, since the Constitution expressly
delineates state and federal sovereignty, it makes no sense to find in favor of
tribal sovereignty over those sovereigns. Ever.
Several cases involve individual Indians who are guilty of some crime,
sometimes heinous, who win below on jurisdictional grounds when the court
18. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
19. Id. at 527-28.
20. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
21. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
22. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
23. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
24. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
2010]
HeinOnline -- 55 S.D. L. Rev. 513 2010
SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
finds that the prosecuting government has no authority over the locus of the
crime. The most-feared case is where a perpetrator escapes to Indian Country
and become "fugitives from justice.26  In these scenarios, the Indian crook
appears to the law-and-order-minded Court like he or she is getting away with
something. And so you have reservation diminishment cases like Hagen v.
27 28Utah. Conversely, you have United States v. Lara, where the defendant
attacked a law officer deputized by both the tribal government and the federal
government, and where the defendant never appealed the tribal court conviction.
But what about cases like Nevada v. Hicks29 and Inyo County v. Bishop Paiute,
30
where Indians and Indian tribes sought to utilize tribal sovereignty to prevent
state law enforcement authority from properly investigating crime? You have
Justice Scalia in Hicks forcibly reminding Indian tribes that they cannot be
havens for lawbreakers to escape prosecution.
3 1
Somewhat similar are the Indian taxation cases like Wagnon v. Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation32 and Chickasaw Nation v. United States,33 where
Indian tribes argued for exemption from federal and state taxes for economic
development purposes. As Justice Souter wondered aloud in oral argument in
Wagnon, weren't the tribes trying to double their revenue as businesses? 34 Or to
put it another way, weren't they trying to get away with something? Prior to that
case was Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery,35 where the Court refused to allow
Indian religious practices to trump the federal government's decisions on lands
the federal government owned. For the Court, it looks like the Indians are trying
to get their land back through the backdoor of religious freedom.
Not all cases have fact patterns aligned so heavily against tribal interests,
nor do tribal interests lose all such cases. Consider Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Technologies,36 where the tribe defaulted on an agreement to
purchase shares from a business partner once it realized the shares were
"worthless." There, the Court upheld tribal sovereign immunity after the
deadbeat company sued the tribe for refusing to throw money down a well.
26. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001) (quoting Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525, 533 (1885)).
27. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
28. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
29. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
30. 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
31. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
32. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
33. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
34. See Oral Argument at 3, Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2006) (No.
04-631) ("My question is, Do we know, from the record, whether the tax that is assessed on the
distributor is, in fact, passed through to the tribe so that, in economic effect, the tribe is collecting, via
pass-through, the State tax and imposing its own tax and still selling at market prices?"); id. at 25 ("-if
the tribe is collecting--it's assuming that-if the tribe is collecting its tax, and it does not have a claim to
greater taxation or greater profit, then how is its sovereign right as a taxing authority being interfered
with?").
35. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
36. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
[Vol. 55
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Compare that case to C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Potawatomi Nation,37 a
unanimous defeat for tribal interests where counsel for the Nation at oral
argument conceded that the tribe may have been relying upon the ignorance of
their business partner in sovereign immunity issues... in order to get away with
not having to pay out on an adverse arbitration award.
Tribal interests have done fairly well in litigating treaty rights. Most
recently, the Court decided Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians,3 8 part of a long line of tribal treaty hunting and fishing rights cases
involving the patently discriminatory application of state laws by state agencies
and state courts against Indian people. In Mille Lacs, counties in Minnesota
prosecuted reservation Indians for treaty fishing and hunting decades after the
tribe had established important conservation and law enforcement structures
designed to preserve the habitat in accordance with treaty rights cases in the
1970s and 1980s that established those rights. 39 The counties' continued efforts
to block the exercise of treaty rights appeared stubborn and highly suspect.
40
Some important cases, on first glance, seemed like they were good vehicles
for advancing tribal sovereignty - but in the end they were not. The first is an
older case, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,4 1 where two non-Indian men on
drunken benders during Chief Seattle Days actually rammed a tribal law
enforcement vehicle. If any case would be sufficient to establish tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, one would think Oliphant would fit the bill. The
Port Madison Reservation of the 1970s supposedly housed only 50 Suquamish
tribal members, a tiny percentage of the population on the reservation. As a
former on-reservation lawyer for the Suquamish with just enough knowledge of
the tribe's history to get me in trouble, I seriously doubt it was only 50 members.
And Port Madison was a reservation where Indian people from all around had
been dumped due to federal and state government interference, so the actual
Indian population was likely much higher than that. Plus, during Chief Seattle
Days hundreds and perhaps thousands of Indians come onto the reservation for
the powwow and ceremonies. But the 50 tribal members attempting to assert
jurisdiction over the majority population likely undermined the strength of that
case.
Another is Strate v. A-i Contractors,42 one of the Supreme Court's ugliest
precedents in the last 50 years. Again, the facts looked like an exceptional
vehicle for the preservation of tribal sovereignty, so much so that the Supreme
Court actually granted a tribal petition for certiorari, one of the very, very few
times it has done so in the absence of a clear split in lower court authority
37. 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
38. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
39. E.g.., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir. 1983) (upholding treaty rights in similar treaty rights fight).
40. And they apparently continue to this day, more than a decade after Mille Lacs. See Dennis
Anderson, Tribal Fishing Battles Loom in Minnesota, MINN. STAR-TRIB., May 11, 2010, available at
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/05/ 1/indian-treaty-rights-showdown-in-minnesota-possible/.
41. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
42. 520U.S.438(1997).
20101
HeinOnline -- 55 S.D. L. Rev. 515 2010
SOUTH DAKOTA LA W REVIEW
(maybe the only time in 50 years). In Strate, a non-Indian contractor driving a
truck hit and severely injured a woman driving on a highway in the heart of the
Fort Berthold Reservation, the home of Mandan Hidatsa and Arikara Nation.
The non-Indian contractor was on the reservation because he was doing work for
the tribal government. The woman, also a non-Indian, lived on the reservation,
was married to a tribal member, and had tribal member children. These facts are
compelling, but the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 against tribal sovereignty. Why?
Well, my suspicion is that the case was hijacked by a very, very unusual,
but devastating, case in the Crow Tribal Court, Red Wolf v. Burlington Northern
Railroad.43 The Red Wolfcase involved a suit for damages against the railroad
company after a train killed two tribal members at a railroad crossing. Allegedly,
a tribal judge addressed the all-Indian jury in the language of the Absalooke
people and suggested the case was a chance for them to punish the railroad for
historic transgressions. The railroad filed an amicus brief in Strate complaining
about its treatment and the alleged jury instruction given in Red Wolf; thus,
Justice O'Connor may have been aware of this case when she questioned the
federal government's counsel during oral argument about a hypothetical case
where a tribal court jury consists of "all the friends and relatives of the victim." 44
Strate, a close case that could have been a hugely significant win for tribal
interests, went 9-0 against them.45 These are the kinds of facts, I suggest, that
mean something to the Supreme Court.
II. REACTING TO THE LOSSES
Indian Country was slow to react to what now is a very apparent hostility in
the Supreme Court and federal judiciary to tribal interests (a hostility that likely
has been present for far longer than the last few decades, and at best manifests
itself as indifference). It wasn't until after the 2000 Term where the Court
decided Nevada v. Hicks,4 6 Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 4 7 C & L Enterprises v.
43. See Estates of Red Wolf and Bull Tail v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. 94-31 (Crow Court of
Appeals, Feb. 21, 1996); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000). See also Brief for the American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872),
1996 WL 711202 (describing the Red Wo/fcase).
44. Oral Argument at 28, Strate v, A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872).
45. Another area of American Indian law that I would have suspected to be an area of progression
favoring tribal interests was sacred sites litigation, with the San Francisco Peaks case being a test case
with great potential. In that case, a federal agency approved the use of sewage effluent to make artificial
snow on the Peaks for the benefit of a ski resort known as the Arizona Snowbowl. The Peaks have a
shortage of snow because the area is a desert, and it made no legitimate economic or environmental
sense to support the Snowbowl. The use of sewage effluent on the Peaks would virtually destroy critical
aspects of the religions of numerous Indian nations located within a 100 mile radius from the Peaks, all
of whom viewed the Peaks as highly sacred. With these economic, environmental, and religious
interests aligning against the Arizona Snowbowl, it seemed likely the courts would recognize the tribal
interests. But no, once again it did not. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
46. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
47. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
[Vol. 55
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Citizen Potawatomi Nation,48 and Department of Interior v. Klamath Water
Users49 that Indian nations and leaders made the first real effort to join together
to strategize. State governments opposing tribal interests had been doing the
same for at least a decade, and had been publishing the Conference of Western
Attorneys General Deskbook on American Indian Law as the guiding text for
their strategy.
50
Thus, the National Congress of American Indians and the Native American
Rights Fund, helped along by dozens of Indian nations, established the Tribal
Supreme Court Project at the end of 2001.51 The Project has helped to
coordinate the litigation strategy of dozens of cases, including several that have
reached the Supreme Court. The Project has assisted in securing the
representation of several litigators who are part of the so-called "Supreme Court
Bar," people with ties to the Court and with deep experience in litigating before
the Court. 52 In fact, one of the original participants in the first meetings of the
Project was John Roberts, now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
Project has also assisted in developing an amicus strategy, which has limited the
number of tribal amicus briefs filed before the Court, allowing them to be more
focused and therefore more likely to be read.
Many observers deemed the early years of the Project successful. From the
2002 Term until the 2004 Term, tribal interests prevailed before the Court three
times, lost three times, and avoided a decision on tribal immunity that likely
would have been adverse. But the last Indian law decision of the 2004 Term,
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,53 was utterly devastating. And since
that decision, tribal interests have lost each of the five Indian law cases that have
reached the Court. The Project's strategies almost worked beautifully in one
recent case, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Company,
54
involving tribal court jurisdiction over a bank well-known for "redlining"
mortgages in Indian Country, but the outcome was still negative. Despite the
work of a former Deputy Solicitor General on behalf of the Long Family, a
subpar oral argument performance by the Bank's counsel (not an experienced
Supreme Court practitioner), and the support of the Office of Solicitor General,
the decision was a familiar result, with the only major change being that the
strategy generated four dissenting votes. I will return to this case, however.
Anecdotal evidence about the efficacy of the Project is mixed. Several
Supreme Court Justices visit law schools, and occasionally answer questions
from students about cases. Two of my former students were lucky enough to ask
48. 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
49. 532 U.S. 1 (2001).
50. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, DESKBOOK ON AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
(Long & Smith, eds., 2009).
51. See Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal Supreme Court Project, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 695 (2003).
52. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L. J. 1487 (2008).
53. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
54. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
2010)
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a question each, and the answers were not positive. One Justice noted that in her
experience, tribal advocacy before the Court was sub-standard before and after
the establishment of the Project. Another Justice cut off my former student's
question and curtly rejected the basis for the question.
The most significant problem with the Tribal Supreme Court Project, a
problem that may be intractable, is the lack of a defining litigation strategy.
Assuming one is possible, I discuss next how tribal interests might proceed in
federal appellate and Supreme Court litigation with an active eye toward
progressing, rather than reacting.
III. THE REBOOT
In the 1830s, the Cherokee Nation of Georgia hired one of the most
influential, well-known, and successful appellate advocates in the nation,
William Wirt, the former Attorney General of the United States, to represent
them in a lawsuit against the State of Georgia. Georgia had all but declared war
on the Cherokees and had legislated to destroy them as a government. As is well
known to tribal advocates, the Cherokee Nation's dispute with Georgia reached
the Supreme Court and resulted in two important decisions - Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia55 and Worcester v. Georgia - important both in Indian law and in
mainstream American constitutional law, as Justice Breyer routinely points out
in his law school talks.
57
The Cherokees had prepared as well as they could for the litigation. They
had adopted a constitutional form of government, separation of powers in the
branches of national government, a sophisticated judiciary, and an American-
style law enforcement structure. The Cherokees farmed, traded, and did
everything that American citizens and a state or local government can and should
do. And to some, they did it better than the State of Georgia, which was one of
the poorest states with perhaps one of the most inept and corrupt state
governments in the history of the Union.
After two false-starts involving a murder case 58 and an ill-conceived plan to
sue Georgia in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction docket, 59 the merits of
the State of Georgia's anti-Cherokee legislation reached the Marshall Court
when Georgia prosecuted a federal employee for going into Indian Country
without state consent. William Wirt was successful in convincing the Court,
packed with staunch states' rights Justices, to strike down Georgia's laws.
The strategy worked in a way that would make present-day tribal advocates
deeply envious, even if it did nothing to help the Cherokee people of the 1830s.
How can it work now?
55. 30 U.S. 1(1831).
56. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
57. See, e.g., Danny Sema, Breyer Discusses Court's History, YALE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 2010,
available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/university-news/20 10/02/1 6/breyer-discusses-courts-
history/.
58. See Georgia v. Tassels, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830).
59. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1.
[Vol. 55
HeinOnline -- 55 S.D. L. Rev. 518 2010
2010 DILLON LECTURE
My colleague, co-author, and friend Professor Rob Williams already
suggested in his most recent book60 what I am about to suggest. He argued in
favor of a long-term litigation strategy along the lines of the civil rights
strategies leading to Brown v. Board of Education.6 1  Professor Williams
identified (as has Professor Joe Singer6 ) the Court's decision in Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States64 as a precedent ripe for reversal. Where else in
American jurisprudence can the government take private property without ever
having to worry about just compensation or due process? I don't necessarily
advocate a full-out onslaught on Tee-Hit-Ton today, but if there is still a
significant aboriginal Indian property right out there being threatened, a careful
litigation strategy could bring Tee-Hit-Ton down.
The Cherokee Nation prevailed in Worcester due to a series of factors,
some out of their control. Georgia had intentionally victimized the Cherokees as
part of a strategy of nullifying federal control over state lands and the state
economy, not to mention the ever-present anathema of slavery. 6 5 The Georgia
legislature threatened any Georgia official with criminal penalty if they complied
with the Supreme Court's decisions. Moreover, along with Georgia, some other
southern states were actively opposing federal tariffs, federal courts, and other
federal government activities. In the end, even President Jackson, the great
Indian fighter and states' rights proponent, quietly forced Georgia's governor to
comply with Worcester, partly as means of avoiding civil war.
Today, I'll identify several major pressing issues in Indian Country that
have a reasonable chance of ending up in the hands of the Supreme Court, and
how and why tribal advocates absolutely must put a near-perfect vehicle before
the Court in order to prevail. This is a piecemeal strategy, to be sure, but I have
hope it can be successful nonetheless. Unfortunately for tribal advocates, I don't
see a single goal that could bind together tribal interests in the same way as the
civil rights movement, which had a goal of integration and the elimination of the
Plessy v. Ferguson67 precedent. But there are a series of "mini-movements" that
could go a long way for tribal interests.
A. LABOR IN INDIAN CASINOS
Whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) applied to Indian tribal
businesses was not settled until 2003 when the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) asserted jurisdiction over the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino
60. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA xxxi-xxxv (2005).
61. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
62. See WILLIAMS, supra note 60, at 89-95.
63. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 769 (3rd ed. 2009).
64. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
65. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 500 (1969).
66. See Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 7, 9 (2005).
67. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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enterprise. 68 Since that time, Foxwoods Resort Casino, 69 Soaring Eagle Casino
& Resort,70 and other tribal enterprises have been subjected to charges of unfair
labor practices. The key arguments against federal jurisdiction lie along two
strata: (1) whether inherent tribal authority to exclude nonmembers from Indian
lands (sometimes expressed in treaty terms) forecloses NLRA application; and
(2) whether tribal labor ordinances foreclose NLRA application. Arguing the
principles of federal Indian common law foreclose NLRA application is a third
possibility, but likely has no chance whatsoever.
Indian nations interested in the outcome of this matter must cooperate with
each other and put forth the very best vehicle for consideration. Frankly,
Soaring Eagle and Foxwoods are not good vehicles. Foxwoods in particular (but
Soaring Eagle as well) employ very few tribal members, and so the labor being
organized is almost entirely non-Indian. The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe,
owner of Soaring Eagle, is the leading proponent of the treaty right to exclude
theory, and they do have a powerful treaty right. The Saginaw Chippewa Tribal
Council also appears to favor a complete tribal ban on labor unions, an extreme
position to take given the consequences. It is my understanding (but I may be
wrong) that both parties see their case as winnable in the Second and Sixth
Circuits respectively. Of course, that is the problem, since the Supreme Court
most certainly will grant the government's cert petition following any loss in the
circuits.
A third tribe, the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, is in the middle of
litigating the issue in federal district court. 71 The Band has adopted a tribal labor
rights ordinance and employed non-Indian labor specialists to adjudicate, under
tribal law, labor charges against the tribal enterprise employer. 72 The Band may
have some of the same problems that will trouble Foxwoods and Soaring Eagle,
such as the percentage of nonmembers that the enterprise employs. But a
smaller, less profitable tribal casino with more tribal member employees will
fare far better in court than an already-wealthy tribe that will look like just
another Indian tribe looking to get away with something, or to double profits.
These three cases emphasize some of the vehicles that might make it to the
Supreme Court for review. Indian nations interested in the outcome should be
aware of the risks and benefits of each. And if there is to be a realistic chance of
prevailing, Indian Country must organize. Foxwoods and Soaring Eagle, if they
68. See San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 NLRB No. 138 (2004), afld, 475 F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 2007). See generally Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption of Tribal Labor
and Employment Law, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 435; Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-
Governance, 80 N.D. L. REv. 691 (2004).
69. See Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230 (National Labor Relations Board, Region 34,
Oct. 27, 2007).
70. See Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort, No. GR-7-RC-23147 (National Labor Relations Board,
Region 7, Oct. 30, 2007).
71. See Little River Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, No.
1:09-cv-141 (W.D. Mich.).
72. Cf Wenona T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 487.
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have not already,73 must back down. Their cases are perfect vehicles for
Supreme Court review from the perspective of the NLRB. Little River may not
be ideal, either, but I am sure that they have somewhat better employee
demographics and financial characteristics, and constitute a better vehicle.
74
B. AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The National Eagle Repository, and the accompanying permit system, are
instances of the worst bureaucratic lunacy perpetuated by the Department of
Interior. 75 Sadly enough, the repository is supposed to allow Indian people to
access eagles and eagle parts for the benefit of Indian religions in spite of a
national ban on such activity. I know from personal experience that such access
often is a sad joke. My great-aunt applied for eagle feathers in the 1980s, finally
receiving them a few years later. It was a smelly, bloody, rotting eagle wing.
Horrible.
The recent cases in this area follow two lines. First, the government
prosecutes Indian people for harvesting eagles without applying for the proper
permit, the Indians arguing unsuccessfully that few have received a permit to
harvest a whole eagle and to apply for a permit would be futile. 76 Second, the
government prosecutes non-Indians, categorically barred by the Eagle Act and
federal regulations from harvesting eagles, and the federal courts toss those
indictments on _grounds that the regulations violate the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. For Indian people, this is a sickening result.
What is needed, of course, is a proper vehicle for testing the regulations and
the repository. A few facts favor Indian petitioners - eagles have returned in
great numbers in some parts of the nation, and the reality of the Repository is to
deny American Indian religious freedom in any meaningful sense. Winslow
Friday, victim of the Tenth Circuit's opinion rejecting his religious freedom
claims, never even knew that the government had a permit system for harvesting
whole birds.78 Indian Country must locate a sympathetic petitioner, someone
who would pass muster before a Senate confirmation hearing, and bring a test
case. The best thing the federal government could do is to continue what they're
doing with the repository and the eagles.
I fear, however, that federal appellate courts will reject the contentions of
73. Foxwoods recently announced that their card dealers have entered into a union bargaining
agreement. See Associated Press, Union Says It Has Contract Agreement with Foxwoods, Bos. GLOBE,
Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.boston.com/news/loca/connecticut/articles/2010/01/26/
unionclaimscontractagreementwithfoxwoods/.
74. See generally Kaighn Smith, Jr., Smith: Tribal Work Laws before It's Too Late, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/
82375497.html.
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
76. E.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009).
77. E.g. United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009), on appeal; cf United
States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
78. Friday, 525 F.3d 938. See John Carlson, Address at the University of Colorado Law School
(Jan. 29, 2010).
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the non-Indians, setting up a Supreme Court challenge. If they win, they win as
non-Indians and that does nothing for Indian people. If they lose, they lose for
everyone. And there are currently federal appeals cases involving non-Indians on
the burner. They have a head start.
C. TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS
Sooner or later, one of two perfect vehicles for Supreme Court review of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over anyone will reach the Court. One possibility
would involve a a nonmember defendant prosecuted in tribal court without the
assistance of appointed counsel and before a jury of tribal members, with all
non-members excluded, in a proceeding before a lay judge. A defendant
convicted under these facts could potentially appeal to a federal court through
the habeas provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 79 A case like that could
persuade the Supreme Court that Indian nations can never possess authority to
prosecute lawbreakers.
A better case would involve a tribal court that guarantees indigent counsel,
provides at least the opportunity for nonmembers to sit on the jury, and provides
open and transparent access to tribal laws and tribal court precedents. Moreover,
tribal judges who are licensed attorneys are an absolute requirement. As Dean
Washburn noted, the proposed Tribal Law and Order Act that extends tribal
court sentencing authority to three8 years 8  will expose more tribal court
convictions to federal habeas review. A series of federal cases affirming tribal
criminal convictions can't hurt.
What follows the Tribal Law and Order Act, of course, may be a limited
form of the so-called Oliphant fix, say, involving tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indian misdemeanors. Justice Kennedy likely is the swing vote on that
question (if it ever arises), and he is of the view that Congress cannot contract
away the rights of American citizens, as he stated in Boumediene v. Bush.82
Winning him over may be impossible without a long track record of successful
tribal prosecutions affirmed in federal habeas proceedings.
D. STATE AUTHORITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY
These are hard cases for tribal advocates to win. The state government can
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 211-14 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Cf Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying Lara in
affirming tribal court conviction of nonmember Indian represented by counsel), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
952 (2006); Morris v. Tanner, No. 03-35922, 160 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2005) (same), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 970 (2006).
80. See Tribal Law and Order Act, S. 797, 111th Cong. (2009); S. Rep. 111-93, I11th Cong.
(2009).
81. See Kevin K. Washburn, Address at the University of Colorado Law School (Jan. 29, 2010).
See generally United States Sentencing Commission, Phoenix Regional Hearing (Jan. 21, 2010)
(testimony of Kevin K. Washburn), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100120/
WashburnTestimonypdf.
82. 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008). "Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like
this." Id.
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point to nondiscriminatory reasons and application of the state law, usually
taxation of non-Indians in Indian Country, and states always have the foundation
and the text of the Constitution upon which to draw for balancing purposes. The
remnants of the foundational Worcester rule - that state law has no force in
Indian Country - is threatened by dicta from the Court suggesting that Indian
Country is part of a state, for example.
83
Here is where Indian Country can take great strides in the federal judiciary,
and perhaps in the Supreme Court. Consider the following fact patterns:
" State government recognizes automobile registration and license plate
of all states and Indian nations except those located within the State
itself;8
4
" Local government enacts ordinance requiring all land sales within its
jurisdiction be subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting sales of
land to Indian tribes absent the local government's consent;
8N
" Local government refuses to enter into a law enforcement cooperative
agreement with a local tribe, refuses to investigate crime on Indian
lands, and even objects to a public safety agreement entered into
between a tribe and another local government;
86
" State government in a Public Law 280 state is ineffective in enforcing
criminal laws in Indian Country;
87
" State government confiscates tribal business assets, assaults Indian
business operators, and engages in this activity on Indian lands.
88
None of these fact patterns are slam-dunks. Faced with the last fact pattern,
one tribe lost badly in the federal courts, but facts that tend to shock the
conscience are all but a necessary predicate to getting the attention of the federal
judiciary.
And there are bad fact patterns to watch for. Where tribal governments are
perceived to be interfering with state government processes, such as in state
campaign finance regulation or state criminal investigation, very little good can
come from that for tribal interests.
The proper vehicle must involve egregious, anti-Indian or anti-tribal state
government action, but even that might not be enough. The federal government
must weigh-in supporting tribal interests in a meaningful way. It seems that the
government's interest in maintaining tribal roads was insufficient in Wagnon.
83. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-62 (2001). "'Ordinarily,' it is now clear, 'an
Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State."' Id. (quoting United States Dept. of
Interior, Federal Indian Law 510 & n.1 (1958)).
84. E.g., Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 476 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 2007).
85. E.g., Baylake Bank v. TCGC, LLC, 2008 WL 4525009 (E.D. Wis., Oct. 1, 2008).
86. E.g., Village of Hobart v. Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin, No. 08-CV-1313 (Brown
County Circuit Court, Wisc. 2009).
87. Cf. Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CoNN. L. REv. 697, 711 (2006).
88. E.g., Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Stovall, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kan. 2002), affd, 341
F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1053 (2006).
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Recent scholarship suggests that the foundational case of modem Indian
law, Williams v. Lee,89 came about not because of the Warren Court's
dispensation toward tribal interests, but because of federal interests.90 In fact, a
clear reading of most favorable Indian law decisions in the Warren and Burger
Courts demonstrate a federal interest that happened to side with tribal interests
against the interests of states, local governments, and individual nonmembers. It
could be said that the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, ruled in favor of tribal
interests on their own merits, but instead in favor of federal interests that
happened to coincide with tribal interests.
Rereading the strongest federal Indian law preemption case, White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,91 we see the federal government providing
loans and technical assistance to a nascent tribal enterprise (the well-named
FATCO) under a federal bureaucratic regime - all of which was barely sufficient
to keep the tribal business afloat. The United States and the Tribe demonstrated
that state taxation of FATCO's activities would effectively bankrupt FATCO,
wasting the federal government's efforts and money and undermining the federal
regulatory regime.
Tribal interests alone, to combat or balance against state interests, likely
will never impress the Supreme Court. In my research and preparation for my
work on the Supreme Court's certiorari process, especially the so-called cert
pool, and how it affects the development of Indian law, I spoke with several
former Supreme Court clerks. Former clerks who were part of the cert pool
generally rejected my claims about the certiorari process, while former clerks
who were not part of the cert pool tended to approve of my conclusions. One
former clerk who was part of the cert pool suggested that Indian law petitions,
like habeas petitions, only attract the attention of the Court (and the clerks) when
the tribal interest has won below. This is because Indians are not supposed to
win, an assertion seconded by Ninth Circuit Judge William Fletcher, speaking
recently about the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in the San Francisco Peaks
sacred sites case.
92
Tribal advocates are very good at persuading the Office of Solicitor General
to side with them before the Supreme Court.9 3 But a survey of the Supreme
Court cases in which the federal government sided with tribal interests in the
past few decades demonstrates that even the recommendations of the United
States fails to persuade the Supreme Court to rule in favor of tribal interests. 9
4
89. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
90. See Dewi I. Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959) - 50 Years Later: A Re-assessment of One of the Most
Important Cases in the Modern-era of Federal Indian Law, _ MICH. ST. L. REv. _ (forthcoming),
available at http://works.bepress.conmdewiballt.
91. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
92. See Judge William Fletcher, Address at the University of Colorado Law School (Jan. 29, 2010)
(discussing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
93. E.g., Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (No. 07-411).
94. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Tenth Justice Lost in Indian Country, MSU Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 07-12 (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1457997.
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The persuasive and scholarly amicus briefs filed by the Office of Solicitor
General seem destined to the same trash heap in which the Court tosses law
professor amicus briefs.
E. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS
I want to conclude with tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 95 This is
a difficult nut to crack, but there is hope. I have a two-part suggestion. The first
is to take down the federal judiciary's assertion of authority over tribal courts.
And the second is to win a Montana case. I believe these strategies should be
done in tandem.
There is a way to defeat federal court review over tribal court jurisdiction,
established in National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians. I recognize
that there are proposals (though no bills) recommending federal court review
over tribal court decisions as a means of incorporating tribal courts into the
federal system,97 but I'm talking about the federal common law cause of action
that often results in a federal court order enjoining a tribal court from enforcing a
tribal court judgment or even proceeding with a civil suit against a nonmember.
The issuance of a federal court order staying a state court proceeding is not
unusual, and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause (among other authorities)
regulates that structure. But there literally is no Constitutional or statutory
authority authorizing federal courts to enjoin the activities of tribal courts.
National Farmers Union, not the Constitution and not Congress, established that
authority.
Since the Court's decision creating this "pure federal common law" rule,
98
the Rehnquist and. Roberts Courts have decided several cases directly
undermining the reasoning behind National Farmers Union. The more recent
decisions limit pure federal common law causes of action to instances where
state prerogatives interfere with federal interests, so much so that they undermine
the federal regime. These cases, to be sure, are rare. Noting these infirmities is
the first step, perhaps enough to give the conservative Justices doubts about the
National Farmers Union precedent.
National Farmers Union established a common law cause of action with the
unexpressed purpose of protecting nonmembers from due process problems in
tribal courts. As with criminal jurisdiction cases, a proper vehicle for winning a
tribal court jurisdiction case before the Supreme Court would require a tribal
court judgment where the nonmember defendants had significant due process
95. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, _ U. COLO. L.
REv. _ (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=1601488.
96. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
97. Cf, e.g., Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: The
Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 497
(1985); Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAViS L. REv.
1(1979).
98. Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 US.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1667, 1716 (2008).
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protections. Coupled with doubts about federal court jurisdiction to issue broad
orders enjoining tribal courts, there may be hope for a winner in a Montana case.
One potential vehicle for Supreme Court review that may attract the
attention of the Court involves efforts by tribal law enforcement to enforce civil
offenses and civil forfeiture on trust lands, especially at a tribal business
enterprise. Some tribes, such as the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians 99 and
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 100 have begun to enforce civil offense ordinances
against non-Indians coming onto the reservation for business purposes. In
essence, the non-Indians charged have committed crimes, and the tribal
government proceeds with asserting civil jurisdiction. A federal court would
then, presumably, apply the federal common law rules limiting tribal civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers. The Supreme Court, in ruling against a tribe in
favor of a non-Indian criminal perpetrator, would have to conclude that quasi-
criminal perpetrators coming on to the reservation do not substantially affect the
political integrity or health and welfare of reservation people. At Muscogee, the
non-Indian brought guns and a ton of drugs to the casino. At Pokagon, a non-
Indian brought a gun inside the casino and accidentally discharged it. State law
enforcement has no jurisdiction, and federal law enforcement is not guaranteed,
given the disproportionate levels of federal prosecution declinations.10 1 The
only remedy available in these cases is a tribal civil fine.
If the Court rejects that analysis, they will be elevating worse and worse
non-Indian actors over Indian people. In Montana and Brendale, the Court saw
innocent non-Indian property owners challenging tribal regulatory authority. In
South Dakota v. Bourland, ° 2 the Court saw innocent non-Indian hunters. In
Strate, the Court saw a negligent non-Indian tortfeasor. In Atkinson Trading, the
Court saw a non-Indian business accepting a windfall in Navajo public services
without paying taxes. In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court saw a non-Indian
bank that refused to fulfill a promise to supply capital to an Indian rancher
during a brutal winter, culminating in the death of the rancher's entire herd. If
the next case is a violent, intoxicated, drug-running or gun-smuggling non-
Indian who has avoided federal and state prosecution, how can the Court still
refuse to recognize tribal jurisdiction?
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I would argue that there are certain cases tribal interests can
win in the Supreme Court, or at least in the federal appellate courts. I may be
wrong about some of the fact patterns I think will be successful, and I may have
neglected to include a few that could be successful, but the point of this lecture is
not to establish a comprehensive blueprint for a long-term litigation strategy.
99. See POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CODE OF OFFENSES § 1(B) (2008).
100. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2007).
101. See Hearing to Examine Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Country before
the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, I 10th Cong. 42 (Sept. 18, 2008) (prepared testimony of M. Brent
Leonhard, Deputy Attorney General for the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation).
102. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
[Vol. 55
HeinOnline -- 55 S.D. L. Rev. 526 2010
2010 DILLON LECTURE
Instead, my purpose is to encourage - and demand - that Indian Country and
their litigation specialists establish a litigation strategy in thefirst instance.
Thurgood Marshall, an architect of the most successful social justice
litigation strategy in American history, once wrote, "[M]ere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process .... ,103 The federal courts have been open to Indian nations since
1966. 104 After 44 years, Indian nations need a plan.
Miigwetch.
103. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
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